Various electronic devices provide characteristics that can be changed after production, including digital signal processors (DSP), field programmable gate arrays (FPGA), etc. For example, an FPGA is an integrated circuit device containing programmable logic components sometimes referred to as “logic blocks,” and programmable interconnects. Logic blocks can be programmed to perform the function of basic logic gates such as AND, and XOR, or more complex combinational functions such as decoders or simple mathematical functions. In most FPGAs, the logic blocks also include memory elements, which may be simple flip-flops or more complete blocks of memories. The logic blocks and interconnects can be programmed after the FPGA is manufactured (“field programmable”) to implement the desired functions.
Such devices may have a trustworthiness that is limited due to a lack of a root of trust at the start of the device lifecycle and throughout the subsequent lifecycle stages. The root of trust is where the trustworthiness begins in a process. Attempts to address this shortcoming include programming a global secret into FPGAs during production. These FPGAs are then broadly distributed in the marketplace. However, there is no single root of trust available for programming the FPGAs or for subsequent lifecycle management to securely validate integrity. If one key (secret) is compromised, a large number of FPGAs (an entire production run) could be compromised.
For these and other reasons, there is a need for the present invention.